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NUMBERING THE DEAD: PATTERNS IN THE MIDLANDS VIOLENCE 
John Aitchison 
Why a Census of Death and Horror? 
This paper presents figures. It t ies  to number the dead, the wounded, the burnt, and the 
terrified in the political conflict that in the last year and a quarter* has devastated the valley 
of the Umsinduzi in which the city of Pietermaritzburg lies. 
There is a purpose to this statistical, census-like approach. The public, both informed and 
uninformed, has so far mainly heard only "stories" about Pietermaritzburg. Some of these 
stories are at the level of anecdote, graphic accounts of individual events in the battle for 
political control of Edendale and Vulindlela. Other stories are more sustained narratives: 
and so there is a UDF story, an Inkatha one, and, indeed, a Police-State one. These stories, 
enhanced with various degrees of theory and analysis to the extent that intellectuals can be 
drafted into the story making, try to make sense of the anecdotes and the press reports and fit 
them into a more general understanding of how people think the world works. At the 
moment the world is not working very well in Pietermaritzburg and the stories about why 
this is so cannot all be true. I have my own beliefs about which story (and which version of 
the story) is truer. I also believe that ultimately a good story is far more meaningful than any 
statistical table. But the enumerations presented here are useful raw material for a critique of 
the Inkatha, state and UDF stories. 
Making a quantitative census of death and injury may therefore be a laudable endeavour. But 
numbers are not human beings. Stories and poems are what will eventually voice the 
meaning of the Pietermaritzburg crisis. These words from a poem by B M Tenza of Imbali, 
published in the Natal Witness Echo of 28 February 1988, express perfectly the horror of life 
for many black township dwellers in the region: 
Blessed are the d a d  
For they will: 
Never be suspected, 
Never be chased, 
Never be unmanageable 
Never be transformed into firewood 
Never be killed 
For they are now: 
Protected from adversaries 
Saved from opponents 
Secured from the persecution of this world 
Blessed are those who are dead. 
The Region 
The geographical area under consideration is what is popularly known as the Natal Midlands, 
with the Pietermaritzburg region at its centre. It includes the city of Pietermaritzburg (and 
the township of Sobantu), the Edendale complex (including the black-owned freehold area 
of Edendale itself, the adjoining area of Slangspruit - another freehold area - and the two 
townships of Ashdown and Imbali), and the Vulindlela area (previously known as the 
* This paper was written at the end of 1988. Given the continuing importance of the violence in Natal, we 
have decided to include it in this collection. 
Zwartkop Location or Reserve) as well as townships located near such places as 
Hammarsdale (Mpumalanga township), Greytown (Nhlalakahle), Howick (Mpophomeni), 
Mooi River (Bruntville), and the areas of Hopewell, Mpolweni, Swayimani (near 
Wartburg), Impendhle, Bishopstowe, and Table Mountain. 
The mayor of Pietermaritzburg has gone on record as requesting the police to stop 
associating township violence with Pietermaritzburg itself. He expressed concern that police 
unrest reports listed all Midlands incidents of political violence as being "near 
Pietermaritzburg", which, he felt, was "simply not true". "Several of the townships are far 
away from the city itself and the impression is given that the whole place, including 
Pietermaritzburg, is burning." (Natal Witness, 27 January 1988). He was both right and 
wrong. Most of the political violence has not taken place in the Pietermaritzburg borough, 
nor, indeed, in the black townships adjoining Pietermaritzburg. It has taken place in the 
black freehold area of Edendale and in the tribal area of Vulindlela, which stretches a good 
40 kilometres to the west of Pietermaritzburg. Me is wrong, however, in not seeing the 
events of the last year as being centred around Pietermaritzburg metropolitan area, for which 
estimates of the black population vary from an official 250,000 to an unofficial one of 
750,000 in an area of over 374 square kilometres (Daily News, l l February 1988). The 
number of violent events that took place in other Natal Midlands areas are comparatively 
low, with the exception of Hammarsdale (a place with its own deadly dynamic). 
The Sources of Information 
The statistics used in this paper are based on information stored in a database on Political 
Violence in the Natal Midlands, maintained by the Centre for Adult Education at the 
University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg. The decision to collect this information was made 
because of the need to provide reliable data for academic researchers. A small grant was 
given for this work by the University of Natal Research Committee. Other resources, 
particularly computers, were provided by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
(CASE). 
The data sources are mainly the following: 
* newspaper reports (mainly from the Pietermaritzburg newspaper, the Natal 
Witness) of "unrest" (and which are normally based on the SAPA version of 
the official unrest report released in Pretoria each day) and of murder and 
public violence trials 
* the South African Press Association (SAPA) version of the police unrest 
report 
* accounts fmm witnesses and victims of political violence and their relatives 
that have been recorded by the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social 
Awareness (PACSA), an organization that had particularly good contact with 
township people 
* other reports received from organizations and individuals in Pietermaritzburg, 
and particularly from the Detainees Support Committee (DESCOM), lawyers, 
trade unionists, clergy, and political activists 
* affidavits placed before courts by lawyers on behalf of COSATU and other 
applicants in attempts (usually successful) to gain interim interdicts against 
Inkatha-linked vigilantes in the region. 
Bias 
All sources have an element of bias. Any collecting of information involves selection of 
information. The real issue is whether one anticipates and corrects for bias, including one's 
own. Our experience has been that reports from the non-press sources of information listed 
above have been reliable and that cross-checking has provided evidence of their integrity. 
Most of the non-press sources are organizations or individuals sympathetic to (or at least not 
hostile to) the UDFICOSATU alliance, and the vacancy in sources is one for detailed 
Inkatha-gathered information. 
Because of reliance on the SAPA and press versions of the Police Unrest Report for much 
information, it must be noted that, firstly, press articles based upon it are almost totally 
devoid of detail other than general area, the cause of death and the sex, and sometimes the 
age, of the victim. Secondly, press reports are not infrequently garbled, generally when the 
reporter or sub-editor has tried to summarize or provide a cumulative account; and, thirdly, 
when compared with independent accounts, events noted in the Police Unrest Report 
sometimes bear little resemblance to what, in our considered judgement, the evidence 
suggests really happened. A good example of this is the shooting of Simon and Smalridge 
Mthembu on 24 January 1988 by Inkatha vigilante Sichizo Zuma (or people with him). The 
Police unrest report of 25 January 1988 makes no mention of their being shot and wounded 
but incorrectly claims that one of the vigilantes (presumably Zuma) sustained serious injuries 
when struck on the head with a bush knife. The Natal Witness report of 26 January 
followed the story given in the police report. Without the evidence from affidavits in an 
application to the Supreme Court for an interdict, this inaccuracy might not have been 
revealed. The inadequacies of the Police unrest report are worse in relation to events other 
than deaths and serious injuries. As a police spokesman put it in the Natal Witness of 29 
September 1987, "we obviously do not report on every stone-throwing because we do not 
want to give these people unnecessary publicity. We simply say it was between groups or 
factions." The lack of full information from the police led to the press being blamed for poor 
reporting. Mr Vitus Mvelase, a member of the Inkatha Central Committee, claimed that 
township residents were beginning to "hate" the press for not reporting on all township 
unrest. "The police are not telling you [the press] everything. A lot more is happening than 
is appearing in unrest reports, and people are beginning to hate you guys. The township 
residents, Inkatha, the UDF: we're all sick of the violence and the people are getting angry. 
I frequently have to explain to them what the emergency regulations are all about." (Natal 
Witness, 29 September 1987) 
What information is collected? 
The statistics collected are on political violence and unrest. This raises the question of what 
is meant by "unrest". The very use of the term "unrest" is awkward, as it is commonly used 
by authoritarian regimes to describe the activities of their democratic opponents, provoked 
into resistance by oppression. In our recording we have adopted the following definition of 
unrest: 
* all acts of political violence and intimidation that would generally be accepted 
as illegal in most societies, whether performed by the state, its supporters or 
its opponents, whether organized by groups and parties or by individuals. 
"Unrest" therefore includes illegal acts performed by the police and army 
' (such as assaults, unjustified shootings, torture and collusion with civilians 
engaged in violence). 
* acts clearly contrary to the Emergency regulations (such as "illegal 
gatherings"). 
The Parties 
This paper attempts to provide information on who is responsible for events of political 
violence and unrest. This is a difficult task, as the Police Unrest Reports give no indication 
of the affiliations of aggressors or their victims (nor their names, for that matter). Where 
information has been obtained on the initiators of violence and those affected by it, we have 
categorized the parties as follows: 
Inkatha: this includes Inkatha members, supporters, vigilantes and UWUSA 
members and supporters, whether such groups or persons are within 
the official structures of Inkatha or not. 
UDF: United Democratic Front supporters, including members of UDF- 
affiliated organizations, members and supporters of its ally, COSATU, 
and young "comrades", whether they are members of UDF affiliates or 
not. Basically this category represents the anti-Inkatha forces who are 
not adherents of the Black Consciousness Movement. 
BCM: Black Consciousness Movement, including AZAPO (Azanian Peoples 
Organization), AZASM (Azanian Students Movement), AZANYU 
(Azanian National Youth Unity), and Forward Youth. 
Police: this includes (and, where necessary, they are distinguished) the South 
African Police, the South Afiican Police "special constables", 
popularly known as kitskonstabels, and the KwaZulu Police (who have 
jurisdiction in areas officially incorporated into KwaZulu). 
Radical applied in cases where it is impossible to determine whether the 
Youth: persons involved are UDF comrades or Black Consciousness youth, or 
both. 
SADF: soldiers of the South African Defence Force. 
Radical: occasionally used as a collective term for the non-Inkatha groups - 
namely UDF, COSATU, and the Black Consciousness Movement. 
We do not, of course, accept the bizarre misinterpretations recently 
placed on the word by the spokesmen for various groups. 
It must be stressed that allocating responsibility and determining the affiliation of victims is a 
difficult task, particularly because in many cases people have apparently been killed because 
of the affiliation of their children. 
A Story of What Happened 
For people unfamiliar with the background to events in the Natal Midlands in recent years, 
the following account is provided with due warning as to the likelihood of some 
tendentiousness. 
The region had until recently the reputation of being "peaceful". Soweto 1976 had little 
impact, and the response to the Vaal revolt of 1984 against rent increases and government- 
imposed local authorities was also limited - in Sobantu, the community council resigned, and 
in Ashdown attempts to establish a council in 1983 collapsed when only one candidate could 
be found. A factor in this "stability" was that civic associations had not developed (and even 
in 1988 this was still so in African areas). 
However, 1984 did see the start of youth organizations affiliated to the United Democratic 
Front. Key ones were EDEYO, IYO, AY0 and SOYO, the Edendale, Imbali, Ashdown and 
Sobantu Youth organizations, respectively. There was some conflict between UDF and 
Black Consciousness youth (AZASM and AZAYO) in Imbali in 1985 (that was a precursor 
to the fighting that broke out between the two groups in Sobantu in 1987), but it was initially 
defused by negotiations. 
In mid-1985 the initiation of a civil association in Imbali was halted by severe intimidation, 
with its leader, Robert Duma, having his house petrol bombed. In August, lnkatha supporters 
threatened the Federal Theological Seminary and demanded that it be vacated. That some 
violence was directed against Inkatha followers is indicated by the petrol bombing of 
councillor Patrick Pakkies's house in April 1985. 
In 1985 W S A  was formed as the trade-union wing of Inkatha, and conflict between 
Inkatha and COSATU became inevitable. The local spark for this was the strike at BTR 
Sarmcol in Howick. The entire African work-force was dismissed. A stay-away on 18 July 
1985 and a consumer boycott were organized on their behalf and were strongly opposed by 
Inkatha. This increased conflict, with some youths probably engaged in coercion to help 
enforce them. The finale was the bussing in of a large Inkatha group into Mpophomeni 
township in the evening in December 1986 that led, in the early hours of the morning, to the 
execution of three COSATU supporters. The inquest findings, delivered in March 1988, 
found that nine Inkatha members were responsible for the murders. 
In 1985 and 1986 Inkatha leaders in Imbali had gathered around them a group of Inkatha 
youths and unemployed men who acted as a paramilitary group, or impi. A number of 
radical youth (and, in many cases, their families as well), both UDF and Black 
Consciousness supporters, were forced out of Imbali, and later from Ashdown. Some fled to 
Sobantu and others retreated into Edendale and Vulindlela. This exodus undoubtedly had a 
politicizing effect on many youths there, particularly in Vulindlela, where UDF youth 
organization was largely absent, and a number of new affiliates formed in mid-1987 
(although they often came under immediate vigilante and Inkatha Youth Brigade attack). 
In May and June there were reports of Inkatha recruiting drives in the region. Often these 
were facilitated by heavily armed groups being bussed into an area. Deaths began to rise, 
though slowly, in the period March to August, with an average of 13 a month. The UDF and 
COSATU have argued that these deaths were largely the result of Inkatha attacks meant to 
intimidate individuals and communities. 
The UDF and COSATU claimed that 90 per cent of Pietermaritzburg workers responded to 
the call for a stay-away on 5 and 6 May 1987, in protest against the whites-only elections. 
That seemed to be a considerable defeat for Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi because the latter 
had urged his supporters to campaign against a stay-away. Inkatha placed a lot of the blame 
for the success of the stay-away on the Transport and General Workers Union, whose bus 
drivers, through striking, effectively made it impossible for many workers to get to work 
even if they had wanted to. Possibly direct consequences of this were the deaths of 12 
TGWU members in following months, and bus stonings by Inkatha youths. Whether the call 
for the stay-away had been planned as a test of Inkatha strength or not, and there is no clear 
evidence that it was so seen by the UDF and COSAW, it certainly showed that Inkatha did 
not have clear dominance in the Pietermaritzburg region. 
In September, the month of devastating floods that destroyed hundreds of houses in Edendale 
and Vulindlela, there were reports of a heavy Inkatha recruiting drive, backed by threats and 
coercion and, in some Vulindlela areas, a final date of 4 October for everybody to have 
joined. According to the UDF, this recruiting drive and associated violence were met with 
growing resistance. A possibly idealized picture is drawn of community defence groups 
being formed, assisted by the young UDF-supporting comrades. 
Horrifying levels of violence were reached in the months from September to January, details 
of which are given in the rest of this paper. Clearly associated with some of the violence is 
the element of revenge and the participation of criminal groups. Varying estimates have been 
made by some commentators of the extent to which poverty, unemployment and crirninality 
fuelled the fighting that had started. Of note in this period are the large number of detentions 
of UDF and COSATU supporters in December, and the growing number of reports about key 
Inkatha leaders in the area, often titled "warlords" by their critics, who are alleged to have 
engaged in acts of violence on a large scale without any serious state action being taken 
against them. The only apparent attempts to halt their activities were the various interdicts 
brought against them by a legal team acting for COSATU. 
The end of the year and the begininning of the new year were characterized by growing 
violence, attributed by the UDF and COSATU to an Inkatha counter-attack named 
"Operation Doom", or "Operation Clean up". However, after January, which ended with an 
Inkatha "invasion" of Ashdown, allegedly facilitated by the security forces, the deaths 
declined in number. This is partly accounted for by the heavy police reinforcements which 
were poured into the area at the end of the year and by the drafting in of 300 special 
constables ( 'ikitskontsbels") in February (the latter creating new controversy as several 
appeared to be Inkatha supporters with records of engagement in previous acts of violence). 
Events and Incidents in 1987 and 1988 
Events and Incidents 
The Centre for Adult Education database contains some 991 records for 1987 and over 500 
for the first three months of 1988. Some of these records are statistical in nature or contain 
comments on the situation, but the bulk of the records each describe an event more or less 
synonymous with what the press and the Police unrest reports describe as "events" or 
"incidents". For statistical purposes, our summaries distinguish between events and 
incidents. Some events, because of their nature, contain one or more, or indeed a series, of 
incidents, such as a burning of a house followed by the murder of the household head and the 
stabbing of the other occupants, or may lump together what must have been several incidents 
(say, the burning of five houses). Hence more discrete incidents are tabulated in the tables 
and graphs below thaen there are records ofevents. Thus in 1987 there were 895 recorded 
events of political violence and unrest, incorporating some 1160 discrete incidents. The table 
and graphs on the next two pages give a detailed breakdown of events and incidents in 1987. 
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We have tried to be rigorous in weeding out duplicate reports and in identifying incidents 
that may not be unrest related. There may still be duplicate records and the occasional event 
that is not unrest related, but we think it extremely unlikely that these would form more than 
7 per cent of the total. 
The initiators of the violence and the affiliations of their victims in the majority of the 
incidents remain unknown (594 incidents had unknown initiators and 632 had unknown 
victims). Where a judgement could be made of affiliations, the following picture emerges: 
PARTIES INITIATING AND AFFECTED BY INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
IN 1987 
Inkatha UDF BCM RY POL SADF Other Unknown 
.............................................................................................. 
Initiator 368 113 19 7 48 2 3 594 
Affected 97 349 5 - 22 1 35 632 
(Note: Police and SADF have been categorized only as initiators in what 
seems to be illegal or unwarranted acts. Violence carried out in performance 
of their legal duties has not been so categorized.) 
The table above can be portrayed as a graph showing, for each party, the ratio between 
incidents in which it was aggressor and those in which it was victim. 
Inkatha UDF BCM RY - Pollce S A D F  Other Unknown 
EVENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND UNREST IN THE NATAL MIDLANDS - 
1987 
Month Records Areas Incidents Affiliation Initiator/affected 
(events) Inkatha UDF BCM RY POL SADF Other Unknown 
................................................................................................................ 
Jan 11 4 11 4 2 - - - - 4 
4 3 - - - - 3 
Feb 8 3 9 7 - - - 2 
- 6 - - - - - 3 
Mar 15 7 18 10 1 - 3  - - 4 
1 10 - - 1 - 1 4 
................................................................................................................ 
Apr 47 7 61 32 9 3 1  l 15 
12 22 - 3 - 9 15 
May 46 6 64 13 4 1 2  - - 1 43 
4 14 - - 5 - 4 35 
Jun 44 7 54 27 5 2 -  1 - - 19 
5 30 - - - 2 22 
Jul 5 1 8 70 32 16 4 - 2 - - 15 
12 32 - - - 3 22 
Aug 42 7 65 43 3 1 1  1 - - 16 
3. 45 1 - 1 - 15 
Sep 101 9 140 41 10 3 - 4 - 1 80 
8 36 - - 3 - 7 86 
- - - - - - - - - 
Oct 197 10 253 91 24 3 - 7 - - 127 
20 81 2 - 1 - 7 134 
Nov 153 15 184 30 15 1 - 18 1 - 118 
11 26 2 - 2 1 1 138 
Dec 180 12 231 38 24 1 - 15 1 - 151 
17 44 - - 6 - 1 159 
*UDF - United Democratic Front and supporters 
BCM - Black Consciousness Movement 
RY - Radical youth, where uncertain whether supporters of UDF or BCM 
POL - South African Police and KwaZulu Police 
Other - includes mainly commerce, public transport and schools 
A summary of our records shows that the following major types of political violence 
occurred in 1987. 
SUMMARY OF TYPES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 1987 
............................................................................. 
Type Incidents People affected 
............................................................................. 
Deaths 
Wounded 
Injured/burnt 
Assaults 
Torture 
Arson 
S tonings 
Attacks * 
Abductions 
Rapes 
Collusion 
Intimidation 
Robbery 
fijackings 
Gatherings 
397 
231+ 
160+ 
52+ 
1 
315 
119+ 
1092+ ** 
18+ 
9+ 
8+ 
76+ many more 
24+ 
2 
1094+ 
................................................................................ 
* Attacks include all (generally vague) reports of shootings, 
battles, riots and confrontations where details on casualties, if 
any, are lacking. 
** Includes about 1000 people who took part in a riot in 
Hammarsdale. 
In assessing the reliability of these figures it has to be acknowledged that, except for the 
deaths, they are incomplete. Unless an astounding 7 people are killed for every 3 wounded, 
the figures for all these types of violence must be underestimates. 
The following provides details on some of these types of violence: 
Wounded There were 151 incidents in which over 231 people were wounded by 
bullets, assegaais, pangas, bush knives, knives and other sharp 
implements. In terns of affiliation, over 35 Inkatha were wounded, 87 
UDF, 1 BCM, 105 unknowns, and 2 KwaZulu police (shot by mistake in a 
gun battle between the S A P  and KwaZulu police). That these figures are 
underestimates seems evident from local hospital records, in which it 
would appear that approximately 20 to 30 per cent of shot or stabbed 
victims taken to hospital die. Given the death toll of 397 people, many 
more than 231 people must have been wounded. At Edendale Hospital the 
number of people passing through its theatres with violent injuries 
increased by 80 per cent in the final month of 1987. 
Arson Arson and petrol bombing have been a feature of the violence in the 
region. Petrol and thatched houses make a deadly combination. Some 
238 incidents in which 3 18 houses and vehicles were destroyed or 
severely damaged is undoubtedly an underestimate, but even this number 
propably meant the creation of more than 2000 refugees, even if only 
temporarily. 
Torture 
In terms of affiliation, over 32 Inkatha supporters' houses were destroyed, 
79 UDF and 169 of unknown affiliation. Inkatha spokesman V V Mvelase 
said in the Natal Witness Echo of 17 September that 10 Inkatha houses 
had been destroyed from January till August. Our database gives the same 
figure. 
Although there have been allegations of police assaults, only one person 
made allegations of torture and a court granted an interim interdict 
restraining the police. 
Abductions A horrifying feature of the conflict has been the number of abductions that 
eventuate in murder. There were 15 incidents involving 18 people where 
those abducted survived. Two of these were Inkatha, 7 UDF and 9 of 
unknown affiliation. 
Rapes 
Collusion 
There have been incidents of rape as acts of political violence. There may 
be many unreported cases but the figure of 9 people raped seems, 
mercifully, low. 
Given the extent to which both Inkatha and the UDF (and particularly the 
latter) have claimed collusion between the state and their opponents, there 
were in fact remarkably few records that provide any evidence of active 
collusion (as distinct from passive collusion in not apprehending 
criminals) in 1987. 
Intimidation This has undoubtedly been on a massive scale, and many reporters have 
commented on this; yet, because it was so pervasive, there are relatively 
few records of this normal abnormality. 
School boycotts Another, perhaps unusual, feature, given the crucial role schools have 
played in black protest in recent years, has been the virtual absence of any 
school boycotts in the region. The database has two, rather vague, records 
of school boycotts. The absence of school-based unrest per se may simply 
be an indication of the success of the National Education Crisis 
Committee (NECC)'s appeal to school children to return to classes in 
1987. Schools as a significant source of violence in the region seems. 
unlikely. This is not to say that schools were not disrupted, and severely 
so, but this was because the conflict outside affected them, usually in the 
form of external invasions into schools by groups of armed men. In a 
paper on "The Impact of Violence on Schooling", given by Mchael Hart 
of the University of Natal at the Seminar on Political Violence in the 
Pietermaritzburg Area, held on 18 April 1988, an estimate was given of 28 
schools affected by incidents of violence or disruption in 1987 and the first 
quarter of 1988. These incidents led, amongst other things, to many pupils 
and staff leaving the schools. 
Gatherings These would be gatherings suppressed under emergency regulations. 
Relatively few of these are recorded, although some of them involved 
large numbers of people (over 500 in one case). 
Armaments Although there was a report of a home-made weapons factory being 
discovered, there seems little evidence of the use of weaponry derived 
from ANC or other guerrillas - one prosecution for possession of hand- 
grenades occurred. AK47s have been seen, and spent bullets found, but 
which force had used them seems very unclear. 
The records for 1988 are still too imprecise and unsifted to provide reliable figures. January 
1988 was probably the worst month of violence, with 161 deaths (though this is probably an 
overestimate, owing to duplications), and since then the conflict has definitely been more 
subdued. In the first three months of the year there were nearly 500 records of political 
violence. The new element in the situation was the use of special constables (the so-called 
"kitskonstables") and many allegations of active collusion between the police and Inkatha. 
There are also indications that schools were more affected, and there were reports of a large 
drop in numbers of pupils in some schools near Pietermaritzburg. 
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The Deaths 
The figures we have for deaths give, we believe, the most reliable indication of the state of 
the violent confrontation in the region. This is partly because deaths are the best reported by 
the police. The following two tables summarize the monthly toll in 1987 and 1988. The 
1988 figures should be treated with considerable caution as they may contain duplications. 
Deaths in the Natal Midlands. bv month 
397 people were killed in 321 events of political violence (some 36 per cent of the 895 events 
recorded) 
................................................................................................................ 
Month Deaths Affiliation 
UDF Inkatha BCM SAP Unknown 
................................................................................................................ 
Jan l l - - - 
Feb 3 1 - - 2 
Mar 9 7 - - - 2 
A P ~  11 3 3 - 1 4 
12 6 1 - - 5 
Jun 12 5 4 - 3 
Jul 15 9 3 - - 3 
Aug 17 10 2 1 - 4 
S ~ P  60 15 16 - - 29 
Oct 83 3 1 15 1 1 35 
Nov 6 1 9 3 3 - 46 
Dec 113 29 15 - 69 
................................................................................................................ 
397 126 62 5 2 202 
................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................ 
Month Deaths Affiliation 
UDF Inkatha BCM SAP Unknown 
................................................................................................................ 
Jan 161 33 8 l - 119 
Feb 60 14 8 - 38 
Mar 14 2 1 - - 11 
................................................................................................................ 
235 49 17 l - 158 
................................................................................................................ 
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Is there Confirmation of the Realitv of the S t a w c s  . . ? 
The figures that the Centre for Adult Education has collected need to be matched with other 
estimates, particularly those of the political groupings involved. In fact, very little 
independent data have been produced by such groups. 
V V Mvelase said on 18 September 1987, in the Natal Witness, that 16 Inkatha members 
had been killed in the period January to August. Our records show 13 for this period. The 
other 3 are presumably amongst our unknowns. A defence lawyer in the trial of 43 Inkatha 
members who were convicted of holding an illegal gathering in the streets of 
Pieterrnaritzburg, Mr W von Willich, stated in court on 9 February 1988 that 100 members of 
the Inkatha Youth Brigade had been killed by the UDF "in the last few months". If one takes 
this as being October, November and December, our figures show 68 Inkatha dead. If 
January is included, another 8 or more can be added. So it is likely that some Inkatha 
supporter deaths are categorized among the unknowns. 
UDF and COSATU documents and journal articles obviously drawing on UDFICOSATU 
sources, whilst providing useful analysis and a coherent "story", seem to provide statistics 
largely derived from the press and monitoring groups (some of which, such as PACSA and 
DESCOM, are UDF affiliates). 
Our records document only one statistical estimate from AZAPO, which claimed that 20 
supporters had been killed in 1987. Our records confirm 5 deaths and there may well have 
been more. 
The Areas where the Deaths occurred: 
................................................................................................................ 
Area Events Deaths. Affiliation 
UDF Inkatha BCM SAP Unknown 
Imbali 
Ashdown 
Sobantu 
Edendale 
Vulindlela 
Slangspruit 
PMB city 
Midlands 
Mpophomeni 
Hammarsdale 
(Mpumalanga) 
Hopewell 
Impendhle 
Table Mountain 
(Bishopstowe) 
Mpolweni 
Greytown 
S wayimani 
Totals 321 397 126 62 5 2 202 
January - March 1988 
Area Deaths Affiliation 
UDF Inkatha BCM Unknown 
........................................................................................................ 
Imbali 10 2 - 8 
Ashdown 7 3 - - 4 
Sobantu 2 1 - 1 - 
Edendale 28 6 1 - 2 1 
Vulindlela 128 26 12 - 90 
Slangspruit 16 4 - - 12 
PMB city 7 3 3 - 1 
Hammarsdale 33 1 1 - 3 1 
Trust Feeds 1 1 - - 
Thornville 1 - - - 1 
Greytown 2 2 - - - 
Totals 235 49 17 158 
......................................................................................................... 
The Geoeraphical Progress of the Conflict 
Restricting oneself to the Pietermaritzburg region, graphing the area in which the deaths 
occurred in each month enables the geographical progress of the conflict to be charted. 
Deaths from Political Violence in the Pietermaritzburg Area 
Place No Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Imbali 37 1 2 4  5 8 1 2 1  2 3 8 
................................................................................................................ 
Ashdown 21 2 2 7 1 2 5 2  
................................................................................................................ 
Sobantu 9 l l 3 2 2  
................................................................................................................ 
Edendale 118 2 l l l 8 29 33 15 28 
................................................................................................................ 
Vulindlela 126 2 7 l 2 16 33 18 47 
................................................................................................................ 
Slangspruit 23 6 17 
Omitting the date from Sobantu (where the conflict was largely one between young 
supporters of the Black Consciousness Movement and the UDF) and from Slangspruit (where 
killings only started in November), it would appear that the violence started in Imbali (it was 
the arrival of refugees from Imbali in Sobantu that helped trigger the sub-conflict there), 
affected Ashdown, and then led to the major battle - that for control of Edendale - and then 
flowed into Vulindlela, where the number of deaths reached horrifying proportions in 
December and January. 
- I Q  'on of i 
In asking what causes began the chain of violence, the evidence displayed in the table above 
and in the graph on the next page would seem to show an Imbali origin to the violence, and 
therefore probably an origin of a political nature. This renders doubtful suggestions that 
floods of unemployed and starving people on the margins of the Pietermaritzburg region had 
an important role in initiating the violence (though, of course, they may well have fuelled it, 
once started). 
That the violence flowed outwards from the townships adjacent to Pietermaritzburg, 
engorging itself with deaths as it did, is backed up by the testimony of eye-witnesses such as 
Tim Smith, SJ, who, in another contribution to the seminar on Political Violence in the 
Pietermaritzburg Area, stated of that part of Vulindlela farthest away from Pietermaritzburg 
that "up until September of 1987 it was one of the most peaceful places to be". "Incidents of 
violence there were, but isolated and certainly never politically motivated. I remember 
discussing with some of our men, at a time when violence was rocking Edendale, how we 
reckoned that it would never reach our area, since our people were too much tied to tradition, 
and the rule of the chiefs was so strong. Inkatha had ruled unchallenged for years, and 
although much of its support was lukewarm, there was no challenge to it. How wrong we 
were. The September floods were the turning point. While we were still assessing the 
damage, we started to hear of the explosion of violence lower down, in areas like 
Sweetwaters and Imbubu, and then suddenly it was upon us too." 
PMB DEATHS BY AREA - 1987 
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Critical Events 
Another consideration is whether the death figures point to any critical event or events as 
having stimulated the violence. The UDF/COSATU "story" of the conflict has it that there 
was a massive recruitment drive by Inkatha in September and early October, accompanied by 
heavy intimidation. It was this event, which provoked resistance, that increased the number 
of killings in September and October. Rebuffed, Inkatha then staged a counter-attack, 
melodramatically described as "Operation Doomy' or "Operation Clean up", in January. A 
graph showing the general curve of the violence lends some credence to the belief that there 
was some critical event or events in September. Another surge is evident in late December/ 
early January. These patterns can be interpreted as showing a link between an Inkatha 
recruiting drive and, later, a counter-attack, although, of course, figures cannot reveal who 
was aggressor and who victim. 
The figures provide no support for the 6 May 1987 stay-away (in protest against the whites 
only election) as having been a critical event. 
DEATHS: 1987 - MARCH 1988 
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It may be fruitless to speculate on police understanding of the conflict or their agendas in 
relation to it. At first, when the number of the killings rose dramatically in September and 
October, there appears, at least for public consumption, to have been a denial of the problem. 
In the Sunday Tribune of 18 October 1987, Brigadier J Kotze, the SAP'S Divisional 
Commander, said: "There is no reason to worry, entry in and out of the townships is no 
problem and under control. There have been no stepped-up patrols and the police can cope 
with the situation .... I repeat, the situation is normal and under control." 
Another police spokesman, as quoted in the Natal Witness of 22 October 1987, claimed that 
a press figure for the deaths was "a gross exaggeration" - it wasn't! 
The Police unrest report figures under-reported killings, as did virtually every other source 
in 1987. This may partly be due to deliberate unwillingness to publicize what was, in effect, 
a civil war that had erupted in spite of a severe state of emergency. The refusal of the 
Minister of Law and Order to provide statistics for deaths and injuries in 1987 (Natal 
Witness, 9 April 1988) is indicative of this attitude. 
In early 1988, although the conflict continued to rage in January, the deaths were reduced in 
number in February and much more so in March. The role of the police in eventually halting 
the massive number of killings through an equally massive deployment of police 
reinforcements is, undoubtedly, important. 
However, the way the police played their role may, in the long term, be equally important - in 
the first quarter of 1988 the police appeared to many observers to have been totally 
supportive of one grouping, namely Inkatha. A similar conclusion must be drawn about the 
use of emergency detention as a means of halting the blood-letting. The rationale for the 
declaration of the 1986 and 1987 states of emergency was precisely that unrest and killings 
had required the use of extraordinary measures, such as emergency detention. The detention 
of a large number of UDFICOSATU supporters and comrades in 1987 is, therefore, 
understandable in terms of this rationale - undeniably some supporters of the UDF had been 
involved in killing at least 62 people. What is inconsistent with the rationale is that, though 
over 648 anti-Inkatha people were detained, not a single Inkatha member or supporter was 
detained in 1987, although, also undeniably, Inkatha supporters had killed over 125 people. 
DETENTIONS : 1987 - MARCH 1988 
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DETENTIONS AND DEATHS : 1987-MARCH 1988 
The Extent of Coll'usion Between State and Political Groups 
The Pietermaritzburg conflict has been full of claim and counter-claim that the State, usually 
represented by the South African Police and to a lesser extent the South African Defence 
Force, have colluded actively or passively with the perpetrators of violence. 
The evidence that can be found in what has been recorded shows that in 1987 the police 
played a remarkably low-key role compared with other "unrestyy episodes in South African 
history. It was only in the latter part of the year and in 1988 that a massive police presence 
became obvious in the records. 
There is no evidence that the South African Police has aided the UDF. The so-called 
kwashange massacre of 25 September 1987, in which 13 Inkatha youths were killed in an 
attack led by a policeman, revealed no evidence of such collusion and the policeman was 
subsequently convicted and jailed. Indeed, his &fence at the mal was that some Inkatha 
youths he had arrested for arson were released after the intervention of a local Inkatha 
official and he had acted to defend himself against them. This very example illurinates the 
basis of much of the UDFICOSATU complaint of passive state collusion in that the so-called 
Inkatha "warlords" - among them chiefs, indunas and councillors alleged to have attacked 
and murdered a number of people - have not been arrested, or, if arrested, have been released 
almost immediately. The Centre for Adult Education database has many records in which it 
is alleged that these warlords have killed people and engaged in other illegal acts and that no 
serious action has been taken against them. By contrast, given that the emergency 
regulations are ostensibly designed to control precisely such conflict as exists in the 
Pietermaritzburg area, it is absolutely amazing that in 1987 no Inkatha vigilantes or 
"warlords" were detained. In 1988, a whole series of applications for interdicts against 
prominent "warlords" made public the belief held by many that there was passive police 
collusion with murderers. In addition, particularly in relation to the Inkatha attack on 
Ashdown township, 31 January 1988, there have been a number of serious allegations of 
active collusion in 1988 between security forces and Inkatha. 
Some Conclusions 
The "census" of the conflict shows that there has been a devastating period of destruction, 
dislocation and abnormality. Against this must be set the fact that the region does not 
provide a good life for the bulk of its inhabitants and that violence of a less overtly political 
kind was already high in the areas near Pietermaritzburg (298 murders were reported to the 
Plessislaer Police Station in Edendale in 1985186). There is a growing army of unemployed 
youth for whom the future is exceedingly bleak. 
Patterns in the figures for deaths indicate that: 
* a political dynamic to the conflict, particularly in its inception, is present 
* that urban township strife has spread outward into peri-urban and semi-rural 
areas and that even the most conservative, tribally controlled territory is not 
exempt from turmoil 
* the violence seems to have a strong connection to Inkatha's attempt to 
maintain (or increase) its influence in the region 
* the state's security forces have acted strongly against only one side (that of 
the UDFICOSATU) in the conflict. 
For many young people, life has become nasty, brutish and short. In an analysis of the ages 
of those killed in 1987 (figures could be obtained for some 237 of the 397 dead), some 68 per 
cent of those killed were 25 years old or under (the youngest was 7). The graph below shows 
the age composition according to the political grouping. There is a terrible message in this 
age composition. The conflict is devouring the young. In the UDFIradical camp it is clear 
that youth are the most affected. Any response to the conflict that does not take seriously the 
aspirations of these youth and offer them a meaningful life (which must include addressing 
political needs) is doomed to failure. 
Academics, reporters, historians and security officials number the dead. But so do the youth. 
The Pieterrnaritzburg conflict will have been indelibly burned into the consciousness of 
young black people. They number their &ad. They consider the life of those left living a 
hell. And they praise and glorify the departed. 
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The Cloud of Darkness 
I've lifted my eyes up to the sky, 
Where our darlings have disappeared 
But nothing I've seen. 
There was a thick layer of darkness beyond the sky 
Beyond the sky, the dark cloud 
Was gambolling with all colours of grief and darkness 
I waited for the cloud 
To move and disappear 
But it remained constant and motionless. 
Suddenly my eyes began to sweat 
The lamenting moment had begun 
And there were no means of avoiding it, 
Except to demonstrate that milk tears fell. 
Peace ruiners had succeeded 
When the two peace warriors had been shot dead 
I've never met them before 
And they've never met me before 
I knew them not, 
But like Jesus they loved me. 
I know this world with oppression and slavery 
Full of lies and misunderstanding 
Was not yours. 
Yours is the one with equality and reality 
Yours is the one with peace and justice 
Yours isthe one with joy and happiness 
Now you're resting forever in paradise 
While we fight and lament in the hell. 
Nakrl Witness Echo, 1 July 1987 
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